The Applicability of the “Turkish Model” to Morocco: The Case of the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD)

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE “TURKISH MODEL” TO MOROCCO
SUMMER 2012 85

FERİHA PEREKLİ*

The “Turkish model,” in the form of a
marriage between moderate Islam and
democracy, the AKP’s electoral success
and the economic growth witnessed in
the last decade, has become the ultimate
allure to which Arab Islamists aspire. This
study focuses on the main premises of
the Islamist PJD (Parti de la Justice et du
Développement) of Morocco in order
to understand what the “Turkish model”
signified for them. By not confining the
“Turkish model” solely to the AKP policies,
but stretching it instead to the pre-AKP
Islamist parties, the idea is to uncover
which features of the “Turkish model”
are espoused by the Moroccan Islamists
and which features are not appreciated.
After a brief introduction regarding the
AKP’s understanding of secularism and
how it differs from radical secularism,
the emphasis is given to the PJD’s
position on secularism. The following
section explores lessons gathered by
the PJD from Turkish parliamentarian
Islamism in regards to engagement in
political participation in the face of state
repression. The last section examines
the transition of the PJD’s discourse
from being moralistic-based to policyoriented,
in which the Turkish experience
once again formed a reference point.
ABSTRACT Within the Arab Islamist circles,
the AKP example has
been considered to be the
epitome of moderation, pragmatism,
good governance and the convergence
between Islam, democracy and modernity.
The ascension of the AKP to
power was certainly a triumph for the
moderate Islamists who opted to pursue
a peaceful and gradualist (tadarruj)
strategy, such as respecting the redlines
of the established order by fielding a reduced
number of candidates for elections
and avoiding any kind of revolutionary
rhetoric. Within the larger debate on
the alleged “incompatibility” between
Islam and democracy, Arab Islamists
were widely accused of “hijacking democracy”
by participating in elections
in order to establish theocratic regimes
with totalitarian features.1 Because the
AKP, the primary proponents of political
Islam in Turkey, strengthened the
Insight Turkey Vol. 14 / No. 3 / 2012
pp. 85-108

* Department of Near Eastern Languages and Cultures,
Indiana University-Bloomington,
perekli@indiana.edu

The Applicability of the “Turkish Model”
to Morocco: The Case of the Parti de la
Justice et du Développement (PJD)

FERİHA PEREKLİ

86 INSIGHT TURKEY

democratic process during the 2000s, Arab Islamists can now face their critics
and contend that they too can be part of the electoral process and actually reinforce
democracy in their countries.

Inspired by the AKP’s democratization reforms, the Arab Islamists argued
that in the event of being given full legal recognition, or full integration within
the political system instead of “restricted participation,” they would replicate the
AKP in striving to reinstate the main components of democracy.2 In this regard,
Tunisian Islamist moderate Rashid al-Ghannoushi lauded the AKP’s feat of developing
a way to reach out to the
various sections of society, adopting
a strategy promoting human rights,
and extending political freedoms in
line with European norms, to establish
a modern democratic state.3
Likewise, in acknowledgment of the
AKP’s widespread appeal, the Egyptian
Freedom and Justice Party, the
political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood,
consulted with members of the
AKP ahead of the elections in order
to make their own message more
palatable to the public and to “correct
the false image that the Muslim Brotherhood aims to monopolize political
activity.”4 Praising the AKP for raising the standard of living, along with
restraining the “army’s tutelage upon the will of the people,5 Ghannoushi also
commended Turkey for openly challenging Israel for first time ever. For him,
this shift in the foreign policy domain, which aspired to address the problems of
the Islamic community at large, strengthened Turkey’s Islamic identity.6 This
rising “Turkophilia” around the region occasionally took unexpected forms,
leading Islamists to see in Turkey what they wanted to see. For instance, Yasser
Burhami, head of the Egyptian al-Dawa al-Salafiyya (Salafist Call) group held
that the Egyptian tourist industry should look to Turkey for guidance, claiming
that “male beaches there are segregated from female beaches, [yet] still attract
Arab and foreign tourists.”7

The Moroccan PJD (Parti de la Justice et du Développement) is one of the
Islamist parties whose leaders have applauded both the success of the Turkish
Islamists over the years and the electoral victories and democratization reforms
of the AKP government.8 In this study, the Turkish model illustrates both the
policies of the AKP government and the Islamist political parties, which predate
the AKP. This article tries to unpack what the “Turkish model” means for
Inspired by the AKP’s
democratization reforms,
the Arab Islamists argued
that in the event of full
integration within the political
system instead of “restricted
participation,” they would
replicate the AKP in striving to
reinstate the main components
of democracy

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE “TURKISH MODEL” TO MOROCCO
SUMMER 2012 87

the PJD, which components of the Turkish model the PJD leaders are willing to
embrace, and which ones they are less likely to accept.

The Critical Difference between the Two Parties: Secularism
As with other Islamist parties in the Middle East, the PJD acknowledges the
AKP’s success in the electoral and economic domains, and aspires to create their
own “Moroccan model.”9 Regarding the comparison between the PJD and the
AKP, PJD members place an emphasis on the differences between the political
identities of the two states (secular vs. non-secular).10 Mustafa Khalfi, the
Minister of Communications and spokesman for the PJD-led coalition government,
underscored the differences between the two countries, pointing out the
primarily long-entrenched secularism in Turkey and the religious legitimacy of
the Moroccan king,11 both of which create a divergent interplay between Islam
and the established order in each country.

In Turkey, the secular establishment (e.g., the military, judiciary and high
level state bureaucracy) interpreted secularism as the exclusion of religion from
the public sphere by confining religion to the private domain.12 Arguing against
the relegation of Islam only to the private sphere, and believing it to be more
than just a compilation of rituals,13 the Islamists of the Welfare Party (WP, 1983-
1998) however, did not embrace this interpretation of secularism. They argued
for the revitalization of religion by placing it more in the center of life. This
understanding of Islam in relation to religious freedoms was eloquently summarized
by Bahri Zengin, a prominent member of the Welfare Party’s MKYK
(Council of Central Decision and Administration), who stated, “Religion is one
holistic entity. Religious freedoms exist in those places where this comprehensiveness
has been protected. In a place where this comprehensiveness has been
disrupted, or some part of it is accepted but not without a feeling of guilt, we
cannot talk about freedom of religion or conscious. Religious freedoms should
be extended to cover the economic, political and social domains and not relegated
to the individual domain.”14 This reading of Islam as a holistic entity was
embodied in many of the Welfare Party’s actions, including the formulation of
an Islamic model of finance, creating alcohol-free municipalities, and aspirations
to establish an Islamic counterpart to the United Nations and NATO.

As was indicated in various party programs, Turkish Islamists chose to interpret
secularism not as a separation of religion from state affairs, but as the
“state’s providing its citizens with religious freedoms and protecting religious
freedoms from any violation.”15 This divergent understanding of Islam (as rituals
in private domain versus being a comprehensive world order), and thereby
secularism resulted in verbal sparring between the secularists and Islamists.

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88 INSIGHT TURKEY

Numerous political parties with an Islamist tilt, including the National Order
Party (1970-1971), the National Salvation Party (1973-1980), the Welfare Party
(1983-1998), and the Virtue Party (1997-2001), were shut down by the secular
establishment due to their alleged involvement in “anti-secular activities.”16
After a period of introspection regarding the political representation of Islam,
various members of the AKP’s upper echelons understood the “self-defeating
success”17 of their electoral victories of the 1990s, as the Welfare Party and its
successor the Virtue Party were not able to avoid being closed down in 1998 and
in 2001 respectively. Exemplifying this self-appraisal, Abdullah Gül, current
President of Turkey and then MP in the AKP, asserted,
We understood that implementing politics based on religious references does
not bring any benefit, neither to the country nor to the observant Muslims. The
political party is not an instrument of religious propaganda. The political party is
an instrument for bringing service to the people. I may be a religiously observant
person, but people who vote for me should not cast their vote based on this fact
alone. They should vote for me because they think that I can efficiently rule the
country. We now consider the issue of religion in the framework of individual
freedoms.18

By opening a freer space for religious social mobilization, increasing the visibility
of religious symbols in the public sphere, and refusing to consider them
as a “threat” to the secular foundation of the regime, the AKP in fact brought a
new understanding of secularism, which Nilüfer Göle labeled, “post-Kemalist
secularism.”19 This is neither the secularism
of the hardcore secularists,
based solely on the rigid separation
of religion from the public sphere
by curbing some religious freedoms,
nor is it secularism as interpreted by
the Welfare Party, which only pays
attention to guaranteeing religious
freedoms by refusing to rule out the
political representation of Islam. The
AKP political elites explicitly expressed their intention of not setting Islam as
the yardstick for political arrangements. As they refused to believe that religious
social activism and greater religious visibility in the public sphere constitutes a
threat to the perpetuation of secularism, their discourse regarding secularism
centered more on cherishing democracy by guaranteeing the freedom of religion
and conscience. In this vein, the AKP characterized secularism as an “indis-
Article 3 of the Moroccan
constitution enshrines Islam
as “the religion of the state,”
without any reference to
Islamic law or its being “primary
source” or “source among
sources” of Constitution

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SUMMER 2012 89

pensable condition of democracy.”20 This mellower understanding of secularism,
crafted by toning down the intransigent aspects of radical secularism, was
advocated by Bülent Arınç, Vice Prime Minister, who stated that secularism
“should be redefined to maintain separation of mosque and state without stifling
public expressions of private piety.”21 Furthermore, the impartiality of the state
towards all the religions was frequently reiterated by PM Erdoğan, who stated,
“We are equidistant from every religious group. We will bring service to Muslims,
Christians, Jews, Buddhists, and Atheists alike. All religious communities
exist under the guarantee of the state. I believe in secularism as a system of
governance, but the people themselves cannot be secular.”22 Although whether
or not people can be secular depends on how we define secularism,23 what is
essential here is the intention of the AKP elites to agree on adopting a system of
governance, which is not shaped by religious injunctions or references.
The Moroccan King as the “Commander of the Faithful”
The king has been considered to be the “Commander of the Faithful” (Amir
al-Mu’minin), since the ratification of the 1962 Constitution.24 He acquires this
religious status based on the claim that the ruling Moroccan Alaoui dynasty is
descended from the family of the Prophet Muhammad, which in turn provides
his rule with religious legitimacy for the vast majority of the Moroccans.25
The 1200-year old monarchical tradition26 is accepted to be an important
component of Morocco’s administrative heritage. It is due to this fact that even
the leftist parties openly admit, “Islam [is] integral to Morocco’s socio-political
identity.”27 According to Article 42, the king is the head of the state, the symbol
of the unity of the nation, the guarantor of its perpetuity, and the arbiter between
the various state institutions. Moreover, he is accepted to be inviolable by Article
46. While Article 42 places the king at the center of the political system,
additional constitutional articles designate his vast executive responsibilities.28
The kingdom’s famous motto, “God, Homeland, and the King” has been codified
within the constitution,29 and is proudly inscribed upon the walls of the numerous
governmental institutions throughout the country.

Article 3 of the Moroccan constitution enshrines Islam as “the religion of the
state,” without any reference to Islamic law or its being “primary source” or
“source among sources” of Constitution. The same article also guarantees freedom
of religious practices to all faiths.30 Among the various legal codes, only
the Family Code (moudawana), which underwent a challenging reform process
in the early 2000s, is based on Islamic law. Apart from the Family Code, all
other legal codes were borrowed from Western jurisprudence, including those
codes governing economic, justice, educational, social policy and international

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relations.31 Therefore, it is the dual identity of the Moroccan constitution, simultaneously
encompassing both secular and Islamic references, which paved the
way both for Islamists and secularists to selectively choose references from the
Constitution in order to vindicate their own political agendas. For instance, the
king’s being the “Commander of the Faithful” and the mentioning of Islam as
the “religion of the state” enabled Abdelilah Benkirane, the head of the PJD and
the current Prime Minister of Morocco, to explicitly define the Moroccan state
as an “Islamic state.”32 He argues that there is no need to call for the re-establishment
of an Islamic state, as one already exists. While it is debatable whether
or not the Moroccan state can be labeled “Islamic,”33 the PJD’s acceptance of
the Moroccan state as fully “Islamic” serves its political interests in helping the
party to legitimize the established order while fostering its political integration
into the existing system.
In Morocco, where Islam is the “religion of the state,” Islamic banks still
have not acquired state permission to operate, in contrast to “secular” Turkey,
where Islamic banks have been functioning since the 1980s. However one is free
to eat outside in Turkey during the fasting month of Ramadan, but doing so is
prohibited in Morocco, a ban, which has been roundly criticized by both Moroccan
secular elites and the secular
public alike.34 As long as the Islamist
groups do not challenge the legitimacy
of the monarchy, the Royal Palace
does not oppose their religious activism
or the public visibility of Islam;
rather, the monarchy invigorates it. In
actuality, the increasing visibility of
Islamic symbols in the public sphere
is nothing but a buttressing factor for
the perpetuation of the monarchy, as
it derives its legitimacy from traditional-religious references. In order to outmaneuver
the social activism of the Islamist groups, essentially in charity activities,
the monarchy has been developing aid programs for poor families and organizing
collective dinners throughout the fasting month of Ramadan, along with increasing
the number of television programs with religious content.35 Furthermore,
the monarchy, through the Ministry of Islamic Affairs has been financing the
establishment of mosques and Islamic education centers throughout the country,
as a way to disseminate the state-endorsed version of Islam. As is the case with
the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, Moroccan imams are appointed by
the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and are required to preach a standard sermon.36
Hence, it is not coincidental that one of the world’s largest mosques, the Has-
Operating within a political
system heavily shaped by
the monarchy, and adopting
an Islamic reference, the PJD
does not agree with the AKP’s
secularism, no matter how
different it is from radical
secularism

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SUMMER 2012 91

san II Mosque, is in Casablanca. The monarchy’s public outreach, in order to
promote a state-friendly, moderate Moroccan Islam, culminated recently in the
development of a project of murshidates (women preachers), who are trained by
the Ministry of Islamic affairs and are responsible for giving religious instruction
to women in mosques. They do not however, lead Friday prayers.37
Despite encouraging the growth of religiosity in the country, the king firmly
opposed the politicization of Islam, which might challenge his highest position
in religious affairs. In his various royal speeches, the king explicitly asserted
that political parties could not be established upon religious, ethnic, linguistic or
regional bases. This is also substantiated with the change in the Code of Political
Parties on February 14, 2006, which prevented the establishment of political
parties based on religious principles.38 Determined to operate within the political
boundaries designated by the monarchical system, the PJD members continuously
reiterated their intention of not appropriating Islam in their official declarations.
Instead of branding themselves as an “Islamist party,” they described
the PJD as a political party with an “Islamic reference” (marji`iyya).39
Operating within a political system heavily shaped by the monarchy, and
adopting an Islamic reference, the PJD does not agree with the AKP’s secularism,
no matter how different it is from radical secularism. Accepting secularism
as a system of governance equidistant from all religions, as Prime Minister
Erdoğan asserts, would be tantamount to the PJD rebutting its own raison d’être,
which was stated in numerous party programs as, “bringing the present constitution
and legislation in line with Islamic law and making it the primary source
of the constitution.”40 Despite the recent downplaying of its moralistic discourse
after 2003,41 the PJD formulated the majority of its political agenda based on the
moralization of the public sphere by adopting Islamic principles as its benchmark.
As part of its efforts to apply moral and religious principles to the public
sphere, the PJD presented various written and oral proposals to the government
between 1997 and 2002, which intended to reduce or stop the consumption and
selling of alcohol. These propositions included restricting where alcohol was
sold, making it more difficult to obtain permission to sell alcohol, restricting
the consumption of alcoholic drinks to the hotels catering to foreign tourists,
impeding all direct and indirect advertisement of alcohol, and bolstering the
penalties related to its misusage.42 In addition to alcohol, the PJD politicians did
not hesitate to correct the “deviations,” which were reported on the beaches.
The party deemed the moral degradations (e.g., mix of genders) on the beaches
to be against Islamic injunctions. The PJD believed that the government has the
responsibility to fight against those situations, which do not respect modesty on
the beaches.43 Beaches were not the only aspect of the public sphere subject to
being brought in line based on an Islamic yardstick; the casinos in Marrekech,

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Mahmudiya, Agadir and Tétouan, were also targeted. Since gambling is not
permissible in Islam, the existence of these entertainment centers was severely
criticized.44 Hence, for a party, which has centered its discourse on moral principles
in line with Islamic injunctions, secularism, which requires an equidistant
position from all religions in the political domain, sounds nothing short of the
Westernization of the state institutions, long criticized by the PJD.45
To put the AKP and PJD’s differing levels of Islamist character into a vernacular
language, the leader of the PJD and current Moroccan Prime Minister,
Abdelilah Benkirane, asserted, “We are thick-bearded, but [their beards] are
much thinner.”46 Furthermore, clearly weary of analogies being made between
the AKP and the PJD, Benkirane asserts, “I am not Erdoğan, and Morocco is
not Turkey. Secularism is not suitable here, because our monarchy rests upon
Islamic law.”47 A similar view was also supported by the PJD’s current Minister
of Justice, Mustafa Ramid, who stated, “In Turkey, Islamic reference was able
to function under a comprehensive secular ceiling (saqf). Here in Morocco, we
are living under an Islamic constitution (articles 3 and 41) and under an Islamic
ceiling. In reality, however, the practices are secular. The state has a religious
reference and our party has an Islamic reference as well.”48
Photo: AP Photo/Azzouz Boukallouch, Nov. 29, 2011
King Mohammed VI, right, receiving Abdelilah Benkirane, the secretary general of the PJD, to appoint
him as the head of the country’s new government.

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SUMMER 2012 93

Political Participation: Lessons Learned from the Turkish Experience
The PJD, which was transformed from an Islamist movement into a political
party in 1998, worked tirelessly to acquire legal recognition from the monarchy.
Heavy state repression in the late 1970s and 80s resulted in the emergence of
intra-group schisms among the revolutionary al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya (Islamic
Youth).49 Offshoot Islamists from al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya, under the leadership
of Abdelilah Benkirane (current Prime Minister of Morocco from the PJD),
established a new group, namely, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) in
1983. Later, they submitted a document
to King Hassan II and the Interior
Ministry detailing the establishment
of their new organization and
their intent to work within the established
order by no longer opposing
the legitimacy of the monarchy and
rejecting violent means.50
Throughout the Middle East,
the early 1990s was marked by topdown,
regime-initiated political liberalizations,
as was the case in Morocco.

51 Political openings (e.g., the
inclusion of some opposition parties into the electoral process), no matter how
restricted, functioned as safety valves for the regimes to channel the dissent of
the aggrieved masses. Although these openings did not pave the way for democratic
reforms across the board, they did lead to the establishment of a regimecontrolled
electoral contestation, which in turn increased the political demands
of the opposition forces.

King Hassan II decided to implement a set of constitutional amendments, in
1992 and 1996, granting a relatively larger say to the parliament, while still not
limiting the predominance of royal power in the political arena.52 Considering
the new political context of the early 1990s as an opportunity space, al-Jama’a
al-Islamiyya accelerated its political activism. Firstly, it changed its name from
al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya to al-Islah wal-Tajdid (Reform and Renewal) by deleting
the Islamic reference from its name in order to alleviate the concerns of the
Moroccan royalty, traditionally the ultimate voice of religious affairs. In order
to demonstrate its political dedication, al-Islah wal-Tajdid established a political
party, namely the Hizb at-Tajdid al-Watani (the National Renewal Party) in
May 1992, and expected to acquire royal legal recognition.53 Their hopes were
shattered however, when King Hassan II refused to grant legal recognition to
While secularism serves as
the diverging point between
the two parties, the Turkish
Islamists’ determination to
continue their political activism
in the formal political sphere,
despite state repression,
constitutes the appeal of the
“Turkish model” for the PJD

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the party. As a last resort in 1996, al-Islah wal-Tajdid decided to unite with a
dormant party, namely the Mouvement Populaire Démocratique Constitutionnel
(MPDC) led by Abdulkarim Khatib (1921-2008), who was an important
nationalist figure in the Moroccan independence movement against France and
who served in various cabinets throughout the 1950s and 1960s. By joining
the MPDC, the Islamists finally managed to participate in the formal political
process and found the chance to compete in the 1997 elections. As Abdulkarim
Khatib continued to be the head of the MPDC, the party changed its name to
the Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD) in 1998.54 In parallel, encouraged
by these new developments, an Islamist group, Rabitat al-Mustaqbal
al-Islamiyya (League of the Islamic Future) united with al-Islah wal-Tajdid, and
formed the Mouvement Unité et Réforme (MUR).55 While the PJD became the
political wing of parliamentarian Islamism,
the MUR became the grassroots
wing of the PJD.
While secularism serves as the
diverging point between the two
parties, the Turkish Islamists’ determination
to continue their political
activism in the formal political
sphere, despite state repression,
constitutes the appeal of the “Turkish
model” for the PJD. In spite of
continuous state constraints, the integration
of Turkish Islamists into the
legal political system since the early
1970s had a great impact on the PJD
cadre’s perseverance in continuing their struggle to participate in the formal
political process. Muhammad Hamdawi, the head of the Mouvement Unité et
Réforme (MUR), praises the Turkish Islamists’ “persistency for continuing political
participation,” despite being subjected to periodic state repression. Their
determination to remain within the legal boundaries of politics, Hamdawi says,
demonstrates the Turkish counterparts’ “perseverance in confronting the secular
establishment.” It is due to this determination, he continues, that the AKP was
able to “neutralize the military tutelage over politics.”56
In the Moroccan context, the decision to participate or not participate in the
formal political process has a special meaning, due to the clashing views held
by the PJD/MUR and another influential Moroccan Islamist movement, al-Adl
wal-Ihsan (Justice and Charity). The Islamist predecessors to the PJD and the
PJD itself agreed to integrate themselves into the formal political sphere and
The PJD’s endorsement of
the participatory nature of
the “Turkish model” was not
restricted to the AKP example,
but harkened back to the
various parties of Turkish
parliamentary Islamism the
desirability of the “Turkish
model” in the eyes of the
Moroccan Islamists was formed
gradually over time

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SUMMER 2012 95

adopted a gradualist political approach. This meant espousing a low-profile by
conforming to the monarchy’s orders to reduce the number of the candidates it
fielded for electoral districts. Moreover, the gradualist approach necessitated
Islamists’ consistent assurances to the established order that the group was not
pursuing revolutionary goals and that
they were not a threat to the status
quo. In contrast to the PJD however,
al-Adl wal-Ihsan has always refused
the legitimacy of the monarchy, boycotted
elections and rejected to participate
within the formal political sphere. Although the organization is officially
banned, the monarchy tolerates its existence. Founded in 1981, al-Adl wal-
Ihsan, headed by the prolific Islamist thinker, theorist and Sufi master, Abdessalam
Yassine (1928-present), retained its anti-monarchical stance after its split
from the revolutionary al-Shabiba al-Islamiyya (Islamic Youth). While refusing
to resort to violence,57 the group has harshly criticized the concept of a hereditary
monarchy, considering it to be “un-Islamic” (jahili).58 Underscoring the
perceived futility of participation in the monarchy-dominated political system,
Nadia Yassine, a prominent al-Adl wal-Ihsan member and daughter of Abdessalam
Yassine, asserted, “The PJD preferred to effect a change within the current
system by participating in it. It did not manage to change anything though,
and [the party itself] was changed throughout the same process.”59
The PJD’s endorsement of the participatory nature of the “Turkish model”
was not restricted to the AKP example, but harkened back to the various parties
of Turkish parliamentary Islamism. Stated differently, the desirability of the
“Turkish model” in the eyes of the Moroccan Islamists was formed gradually
over time. Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), the precursor Islamist movement
to the PJD, studied Turkish Islamist politics throughout the late 1980s and
1990s in a detailed manner, and followed the developments in its newspapers,
al-Islah and al-Raya.60 The newspapers covered the Welfare Party’s electoral
ascendancy and the challenges it confronted. While recalling their program of
the past decades, Mustafa Khalfi, the Minister of Communications and spokesman
for the PJD-led coalition government, noted,
We examined what happened in the 1970s with the National Salvation Party. We
sometimes hold seminars that just look at the Turkish experience. We learned
from them that while participating, you are going to implement what you are
looking for instead of boycotting or ignoring the democratic system. In the late
1980s, we crystallized the idea of participation in parliamentary politics as we
began to see the positive elements of the democratic system.61
For the PJD, the Turkish model
concretized the marriage
between “Islamic values” and
the “modern civil state

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For the PJD, the Turkish model concretized the marriage between “Islamic
values” and the “modern civil state.”62 A common demand between the Islamistled
governments of the post-Arab Spring and the PJD is the call for the formation
of a civil state. This meant the absence of a partial or full-fledged theocracy,
where there is a supra-constitutional body of religious scholars who are authorized
to exert tutelage over the elected parliamentarian bodies.63 The civil state
necessitates the formulation of state institutions, in which the rule of law and the
provision of social and political freedoms constitute the essential elements of the
democratic political order. This arrangement, Khalfi argues, helps to eradicate
the “Islamist specter” and enables Islamists to become influential political actors,
capable of pursuing democratic reforms “akin to the 2010 constitutional
reforms which the AKP government implemented.”64
Transition from Identity-Based Approach to Policy-Oriented
Approach
Borrowing Kaufman’s definition of “identity politics,” as the belief that identity
itself “is and should be a fundamental focus of political work,”65 the Turkish
Islamists devised an identity-based political discourse accentuating the Islamic
identity, mainly throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The Welfare Party (WP) appropriated
Islam by labeling its followers as “believers,”66 forming a polarizing
political environment regarding the religious status of the “others” who do not
vote for the WP. Adopting a discourse based on Islamic identity only aggravated
the already existing cultural rifts within society, and hardened the efforts of
reconciliation, dialogue, and cross-ideological coalitions. For a political party,
which intends to remain a fringe party, identity-based politics is an appropriate
fit. However, as the WP began to consider itself a viable political alternative
in the early 1990s, it felt the need to tone down its exclusionary, identity-based
discourse. Stated differently, as the WP set its goal to appeal to a wider audience
in the early 1990s, the downplaying of its identity discourse became inevitable.67
This shift is witnessed for the first time in the WP’s advertisements for the 1991
national elections. These advertisements found a widespread circulation in the
mainstream media, including billboards, commercials on TV and in print.68 They
touched not only upon the predicaments of the religious segments of society,
but also addressed a wide range of socio-economic problems, which aggrieved
mainly the urban poor. For instance, bearing the slogan, “A New World,” one
of the posters related the non-covered woman’s complaint, “I am a woman, that
is to say, a human being...” under which, the WP’s response was written, “The
WP would protect the honor of being a woman.”69 Another showed a man saying,
“The taxes are breaking our backs,” and the accompanying byline states

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE “TURKISH MODEL” TO MOROCCO
SUMMER 2012 97

that the WP “will abolish the unrighteous taxes.”70 Yet another portrayed a prostitute
saying, “I’m a prostitute, what about my life?” The response here was that
the WP “will change the system that forces people into that life.”71
The Virtue Party (VP) succeeded the Welfare Party (WP) after its closure
in 1998, due to the secular establishment’s large-scale crackdown on Islamist
activism, known as the “February 28 Process.”72 The aim to appeal to the wider
audience in order to come to power, and the external shock of the February 28
Process upon the internal dynamics of the WP, initiated a series of self-appraisals
by the Turkish parliamentarian Islamists. The VP’s electoral manifesto of
the 1999 national elections did not include
any religious reference or any
implication of a worldview based on
binary oppositions, such as “righteousness
versus fallaciousness,” as
was extensively used by the senior
members of the WP. In its preamble
section, Virtue Party head Recai Kutan,
from Necmettin Erbakan’s old
guard cadre, highlighted the overall transition from values, which were determined
by the rigid ideologies of the 20th century to the new values that centered
on individual, human rights and democracy.73 The new world order, he argued,
urges policies for “further participatory and an inclusionary worldview.”74 Instead
of the dichotomous WP stance, which pitted Islam against the West, primarily
in the cultural domains, Kutan seemed to acknowledge the universality
of some Western-originated concepts (e.g., human rights and democracy) and
the necessity to cherish them, while previously these ideals were approached
with caution. Instead of dwelling in ideological conflicts, the 1999 electoral
manifesto prioritized solving the practical problems of the country. This ranged
from broad recommendations of a reform project among various branches of the
state (legislative, executive, and judiciary), to socio-economic policies including
family, science, health, education, environment, energy, transportation, agriculture,
and tourism.75

The Turkish experience, which achieved a transition from identity-based approach
to policy-based approach, caught the attention of the Moroccan Islamists.
This can be examined through the assertion of Mustafa Khalfi, who stated,
We also developed some ideas that in politics, you need to approach society and
the state by utilizing policy-based ideas, not mainly religious ideas that reflect
what the state and society is in need of at the time. We learned a great deal
about this openness to the other parties and actors from the Turkish experience.
The Turkish experience, which
achieved a transition from
identity-based approach to
policy-based approach, caught
the attention of the Moroccan
Islamists
FERİHA P
EREKLİ
98 INSIGHT TURKEY

The Moroccan case took Turkey as an example to see how a faith-based, or an
identity-based, political party could develop pragmatic policies to deal with the
challenges of realities at the state and society level.76
Khalfi’s remarks espousing the Turkish model in relation to the transition
from an identity-based approach to a policy-based approach have been shaped by
domestic events. Morocco, which has been known for its peaceful Sufi-derived
brand of Islam, was shaken by five suicide bombings, perpetrated by twelve
radical Islamists, in Casablanca on May 16, 2003. The attacks left 45 dead and
more than 100 people wounded. The attackers, whom state authorities argued
had been recruited locally by the Moroccan branch of al-Qaeda (the Moroccan
Islamic Combat Group), came from the poor slums of Casablanca.77 Despite
the fact that the bombings were born out of radical jihadi Islamism, the PJD, a
moderate Islamist party which had been participating in parliament since 1997,
was stigmatized by the state authorities, leftist secular parties, and the secular
media alike. Opponents argued that it had been the PJD’s anti-Western and anti-
Israel rhetoric which had laid the ideological groundwork for the attacks.78 In
this regard, the close ties between the MUR (the grassroots wing of the party)
and the PJD were criticized heavily by state authorities and the secular political
parties. In the aftermath of the bombing, the king gave various royal speeches,
which demarcated the lines between politics and religion by arguing that religious
affairs should only be places of worship, scientific councils of the religious
scholars, and mosques.79
Bombarded by both the secularists and the monarchy, the PJD decided to deemphasize
its religious discourse by distancing itself from the MUR in order to alleviate
these external pressures.
This necessitated the emergence
of introspection about the dual
identity of the party, which
led to the severing, though not
breaking, of ties between the
grassroots movement MUR and
the PJD.80 The MUR’s meeting
of the Majlis al-Shura (Consultative
Council) in 2004 led to the decision to implement a “differentiation”
(tamyīz), and not a “separation” (faṣl), between the PJD and the MUR.81 The
party transferred the majority of the identity issues, such as invigorating Islamic
education, Islamic morals, and religiosity in the society, to the MUR, thus refining
the lines between political and da‘wah activism (calling to Islam).82 When
asked whether or not this implies a step towards secularization, Benkirane deTHE

APPLICABILITY OF THE “TURKISH MODEL” TO MOROCCO
SUMMER 2012 99

nied this intent, and emphasized their party’s “Islamic reference.”83 According
to the new arrangement, the MUR became institutionally independent from the
PJD, while developing a different leadership cadre. The MUR, the main financier
and source of manpower for the PJD’s electoral campaigns, withdrew more
to the civil society domain, aiming to generate “pious individuals.”84 Regarding
this distinction between the two organizations, the head of the MUR, Hamdawi,
asserted, “The party (PJD) and the movement (MUR) are institutionally
independent from each other, and the [current] relations between the two can
be labeled as a partnership (sharaka),
while they used to fully support each
other.”85 This differentiation enabled
the PJD to devise public policies to
find practical solutions to day-to-day
problems, while leaving the discussions
of how to consolidate religiosity
with society to the MUR. Put
differently, while Islamist idealism
has been retained by the MUR due
to its continuing religious activism,
the party has become more realistic
in understanding the bright lines of the political system and more pragmatic so as
to maintain its viability in the parliament. This also resulted in the diminishment
of the dual character of the PJD, as being both a political party and a religious
movement, and the criticism expressed by its political rivals that it engaged in a
“double-tongued discourse.”86
The PJD organized a national dialogue in 2008 entitled, “From an Identity-
Based Discourse (al-khitāb al-huwīyyāti) to a Policy-Based Discourse (khitāb altadbīr),”
where the Turkish experience was widely discussed. The meeting underlined
the importance of the delineation between the domains of political party
activism and religious social activism, and their differentiation at the institution,
discourse, and functional levels. In the aftermath of the functional differentiation
between the PJD and the MUR, PJD members began to utilize modern political
terminology more frequently, including human rights, democracy, civil state,
pluralism, rule of law, and the peaceful rotation of power.87 The PJD’s heavily
moralizing discourse, which it was known for between 1997 and 2002, heavily
criticized the non-Islamic life style practices in tourism, education, cinema,
entertainment and the arts. This later gave way to an emphasis on constitutional
and judicial reform, the prevention of corruption in politics, and the enlargement
of the parliament’s prerogative as the only accountable political entity in
the Moroccan political arena.88
The new program no longer
called for the current Moroccan
civil law system to fall closer in
line with Islamic law; instead,
the electoral manifesto
emphasized the “protection of
Morocco’s Islamic identity” in
the face of globalization

FERİHA PEREKLİ
100 INSIGHT TURKEY

The electoral program of September 7, 2007, with its slogan, “Together to
Build a Just Morocco,”89 focused primarily on economic and public policy-related
issues.90 The new program no longer called for the current Moroccan civil
law system to fall closer in line with Islamic law; instead, the electoral manifesto
emphasized the “protection of Morocco’s Islamic identity” in the face of globalization.
91 In contrast to the previous
manifestos, such as the manifesto for
the 2002 national elections, where
religious law was accepted to be the
primary source of legislation,92 the
2007 manifesto made no mention of
the application of shari’ah. The party
opted instead to advocate for a general
reinforcement of moral principles
with a special emphasis on moderation,
in order to confront extremism,
restate their support for missionary
organizations and their activities under the section labeled “Bolstering National
Values and Morocco’s Islamic Identity.”93 In the list of various challenges facing
Morocco, the primary focus was given to socio-economic problems (e.g., the
fight against unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, and expanding higher education),
and the endorsement of a transition to democracy (judicial reform, constitutional
reform, and reinforcement of human rights and public freedoms).94 The
program’s sole reference to Islam came when discussing Islamic banking, which
is offered as a way to “diversify investment tools.”95
Similar to the 2007 electoral manifesto, the electoral manifesto for the June
12, 2009 municipal elections did not refer to religious law. Instead, the party
utilized neutral terminology, such as “putting the historical - cultural identity of
the cities on display.”96 Instead of a religious discourse which aimed to increase
the religiosity of society, the 2009 manifesto placed the majority of its emphasis
upon socio-economic policies, such as establishing municipal hospitals, the fight
against illiteracy, encouraging institutions which deal with women’s issues, increasing
financial help for the needy, and improving public parks.97 Similarly to
2007 and 2009, Islamic law was not present in the latest electoral manifesto for
the 2011 national elections. The establishment of the rule of law, the reinforcement
of democracy, and the fight against corruption and establishing a strong national
economy were heralded as being among the PJD’s most important goals,
as detailed in their 2011 manifesto. Comparatively, the emphasis given to the
nation’s “Islamic character” and the “Moroccan identity” were further down the
same list of goals.
The downplaying of the
identity-based discourse, which
was triggered by external
pressure in the aftermath of the
2003 Casablanca bombings,
continued unabated as the
PJD became the major partner
in a coalition government in
December, 2011

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE “TURKISH MODEL” TO MOROCCO
SUMMER 2012 101

The downplaying of the identity-based discourse, which was triggered by
external pressure in the aftermath of the 2003 Casablanca bombings, continued
unabated as the PJD became the major partner in a coalition government in
December, 2011. This enabled the party to devise practical solutions to socioeconomic
ailments, as was stated in its electoral pledges, and to formulate a
middle ground between the political agenda of the coalition government and the
royal authorities. Today, the dilemma faced by the PJD as a centrifugal political
power, comes both from attempting to challenge imbedded interests of the
makhzen98 and from maintaining a peaceful co-existence with the royal court.
The latter is unavoidable for the PJD, as the party members recognize the linchpin
role of the monarchy in the political domain, and the necessity to maintain
cordial relations with it for the coalition government’s perpetuity.
After becoming Prime Minister in December 2011, Benkirane designated
five areas upon which the new government should center its focus, such as the
judiciary, education, unemployment, housing, and health.99 In order to put the
electoral promises into practice, the PJD made a move to disclose a list of those
corrupt individuals that benefited from the transport licenses, as an act to “put
an end to financial corruption.”100 However, the preparation of the list was delayed,
most likely due to the intervention of the makhzen, prompting Benkirane
to admit the difficulty they faced in fighting the rampant corruption throughout
the country.101 In June of 2012, in a parliamentary session, the combat against
corruption continued with PJD MP Abdelaziz Aftati’s accusation that the ex-
Finance Minister was embezzling 400,000 dirhams (approximately $46,000
USD) monthly, on top of his regular salary.102 This initiative, however, was
not endorsed by King Muhammad
VI who asked Benkirane’s group to
“devote more time to confront the
problems of the country instead of
provoking polemics, which serve no
Moroccans.”103 The PJD-led government’s
goal of fighting corruption
went hand-in-hand with working on
a reform of the pricey subsidy system.
Lamenting the current subsidy
system, governmental officials asserted that over half of the funds spent on
subsidies were going to the wealthiest one fifth of the country’s 33 million citizens.
104 The aim of the new subsidy reform was to cut the subsidies going to the
“sectors of the economy that do not need the state’s support,” which would “enable
us to save a few billion [dirhams] this year alone,” as Najib Boulif, General
Affairs and Governance Minister, elaborated.105 In order to alleviate the rift be-
The Turkish model, combining
the political experience of the
Islamist parties prior to the
AKP and the AKP’s decadelong
political tenure, has been
a source of inspiration for the
Moroccan PJD

FERİHA PEREKLİ
102 INSIGHT TURKEY

tween privileged and under-privileged Moroccans and make good on its election
promises to reduce the number people living in poverty by one half,106 a figure
estimated at nearly 8.5 million, the government created additional compensation
funds for the needy (widows, divorced women, the disabled, and the elderly). It
planned on doing so by subsidizing a number of basic products.107 The subsidy
reform was accompanied by new taxes upon companies and raising taxes on
alcohol as a way to increase state revenues, as called for by the 2012 budget.
Conclusion
The Turkish model, combining the political experience of the Islamist parties
prior to the AKP and the AKP’s decade-long political tenure, has been a source
of inspiration for the Moroccan PJD as well as various Islamist parties throughout
the Middle East. Each and every achievement made by the AKP, be it electorally,
economically, or politically, was evaluated as an accomplishment for
the greater Islamist project, despite the AKP’s founders’ repeated rejection of
an Islamist political identity.
One significant factor, which makes the Turkish model attractive for the
PJD, is the determination of Turkish parliamentarian Islamists to maintain their
political activism in the formal political
process, despite being subjected
to the secular establishment’s previous
crackdowns. Operating in a monarchy-
dominated political system,
which opposes political Islam, it was
tremendously difficult for the PJD to
receive royal consent to participate in
the formal political sphere. Despite
being subjected to the royal constraints, the PJD maintained its resoluteness to
compete elections and finally culminated in its ascent to power in November
2011. The monarchy was not alone in impeding the PJD’s political aspirations,
as a rival, anti-monarchical Islamist group, al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and Charity),
also functioned as one of the severe critics of parliamentarian Islamism. In
this vein, the determination of the Turkish parliamentarian Islamists to remain in
the formal political process and their ascent to power in 2002, inspired the PJD
and bolstered the party’s actions in the face of its critics.
The other factor making the Turkish model appealing for the PJD is the
Turkish Islamists’ successful transition from an identity-based to a policy-oriented
approach since the early 1990s. The bloody 2003 Casablanca terrorist bombings
became a turning point for the PJD to reassess its organizational structure,
Turkish Islamists’ experience
of transition from an
identity-based approach to
a policy-oriented approach
was identified as an important
lesson in various PJD meetings

THE APPLICABILITY OF THE “TURKISH MODEL” TO MOROCCO
SUMMER 2012 103

its political program and its discourse. Subjected to massive monarchical and
secularist pressure to alter its organizational structure and profoundly moralistic
discourse, the PJD drew the lines between its social movement and political
party wings. In this vein, the Turkish Islamists’ experience of transition from an
identity-based approach to a policy-oriented approach was identified as an important
lesson in various PJD meetings. Following this path, the morals-first agenda
of the pre-2003 electoral manifestos
was replaced by the post-2003 party
releases and declarations, suffused
with calls for greater democratization,
constitutional, judicial, health
and judicial reforms.
Despite various factors rendering
the Turkish model appealing for the
PJD, secularism, no matter how malleable
the AKP’s interpretation might
be, has not echoed well, neither
within the PJD nor in its grassroots
movement, the MUR. This is partly
due to the incompatibility of secularism with the non-secular character of the
Moroccan monarchy and the PJD’s founding tenets. As was stated in its various
party releases, the PJD aims to redress the inconsistency between the Islamic
essence of the constitution and secular practices on the ground.

Endnotes
1. John Esposito, Islam and Politics (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1998), p. 327.
2. Meliha Benli Altunışık, “Turkey: Arab Perspectives,” Foreign Policy Analysis Series: TESEV
Publications, No.11, (May 2010), p.17.
3. Rashid Ghannoushi, “ هضارغأ يمالسإلا ديدجتلا ققح له ؟ [Has Reformist Islam Realized Its
Goals?]” Al-Jazeera.net, (October 7, 2010), retrieved June 10, 2012 from http://www.aljazeera.
net/pointofview/pages/e811d820-90e2-4f98-b9a3-7d7cc18a8939.
4. Editorial, “Freedom and Justice Party seeks election advice from Turkey’s ruling party,”
(November 18, 2011), retrieved June 12, 2012 from http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/
freedom-and-justice-party-seeks-election-advice-turkeys-ruling-party.
5. Rashid Ghannoushi, “ هضارغأ يمالسإلا ديدجتلا ققح له ؟ [Has Islamic Revival Realized Its
Goals?].”
6. Interview with Rashid Ghannoushi, “ يسايسلا مالسإلا بلاطم ربكأ ةيرحلا :يشونغلا [Ghannoushi:
Freedom is Political Islam’s Greatest Demand]” (December 31, 2010), retrieved May 11,
2012 from http://wa3yena.maktoobblog.com/ ./سلا-مالسإلا-بلاطم-ربكأ-ةيرحلا-يشونغلا/ 1205
7. Editorial, “We’ll allow a Coptic president when Israel allows a Muslim one: Salafist leader”
AhramOnline, (December 6, 2011), retrieved June 1, 2012 from http://english.ahram.org.eg/~/
NewsContent/1/64/28628/Egypt/Politics-/Well-allow-a-Coptic-president-when-Israel-allows-a.
aspx.
Despite various factors
rendering the Turkish
model appealing for the
PJD, secularism, no matter
how malleable the AKP’s
interpretation might be, has
not echoed well, neither within
the PJD nor in its grassroots
movement
FERİHA PEREKLİ
104 INSIGHT TURKEY
8. Editorial, “ 2007 ] ناغودرأ حاجنو 2007 تاباختنا Turkish Elections: The Success of Erdoğan],”
al-Tajdid, July 24, 2007.
9. Editorial, “Morocco’s new PM looks to ‘Turkish model’ for new government,” Today’s
Zaman, (December 1, 2011), retrieved June 9, 2012 from http://www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_
getNewsById.action?newsId=264487.
10. The author’s interview with Abdelilah Benkirane, March 8, 2010, Rabat; Mustafa Khalfi,
يكرتلا جذومنلاو نويمالسإلاو برغملا“ [Morocco and Islamists and the Turkish Model], al-Tajdid,
February 12, 2010; Muhammad Yatim, “ ةيمالسإلا تاكرحلا دنع يتايوهلا باطخلا يف ةيدقن ةءارق
[A critical reading on the identity discourse of the Islamist Movements]” reprinted from al-Tajdid,
(May 30, 2008), retrieved May 5, 2012 from http://www.maghress.com/attajdid/42118.
11. Mustafa Khalfi, “ يكرتلا جذومنلاو نويمالسإلاو برغملا [Morocco and Islamists and the
Turkish Model], al-Tajdid, February 12, 2010.
12. Ahmet Kuru, “Passive and Assertive Secularism: Historical Conditions, Ideological Struggles,
and State Policies toward Religion,” World Politics, Vol. 59, No. 4, (July 2007), 568-594,
p.571.
13. Süleyman Arif Emre, Siyasette 35 Yıl (Ankara, Keşif Yayınları, 2002), p.171; “Necmettin
Erbakan: “Anayasa birey ve toplum için vardır,” Yeni Zemin, April 1993, p.31.
14. Mehmet Emin Gerger, Din, Siyaset ve Laiklik (Istanbul, Nehir Yayınları, 1989), p. 25.
For the debate on the holistic character of the Abrahamic religions and secularism in Turkey see:
Nuray Mert, “Laiklik Tartışması ve Siyasal Islam,” Cogito, Laiklik, No.1, Summer 1994, 89-101,
p.92.
15. The Welfare Party, 1983 Covenant and party program, Ankara, 1985, p.37; The Welfare
Party, 1986 Covenant and Party Program, Samsun, p. 6-7; the Welfare Party, 1991 Electoral
Manifesto, p.6. and 32-34.
16. Haldun Gülalp, “Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Welfare Party,” The
Muslim World, Vol. 89, No.1 (January 1999), 22-55, p.40.
17. Ihsan Dağı, “The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics and Human Right
Discourse in the Search for Security and Legitimacy” in Hakan Yavuz (ed), The Emergence of a
New Turkey (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2006), p.90. See also: Ihsan Dağı,
“Turkey’s AKP in Power,” Journal of Democracy, Volume 19, No. 3 (July 2008), 25-30.
18. Interview with Abdullah Gül, “Gül: Hayat tarzım değil, siyaset tarzım değişti,” Gerçek
Hayat (24-30 August 2001).
19. Interview with Nilüfer Göle by Juliana DeVries, “Shifting Identities and the Stakes of
Turkish Democracy,” Eutopia Institute of Ideas, (October 19, 2011), retrieved June 3, 2012 from
http://www.eutopiainstitute.org/2011/10/shifting-identities-and-the-stakes-of-turkish-democracyinterview-
with-nilufer-gole/.
20. Ahmet Insel, “The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey,” The South Atlantic
Quarterly, Vol.102, No. 2/3, (Spring/Summer 2003), 293-308, p.304.
21. Editorial, “Arınç: Sosyal hayatı cezaevine çevirmeyelim,” Hürriyet, (April 25, 2006), retrieved
April 28, 2012 from http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=4312365&tarih=2006-
04-25 and Editorial, “Arınç: Laiklik yeniden yorumlanmalı,” Sabah, (October 14, 2011), retrieved
June 3, 2012 from http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/10/14/arinc-laiklik-yeniden-yorumlanmali.
22. Editorial, “Başbakan Erdoğan: Laikliği Savunuyorum,” Radikal (October 14, 2007).
23. Ahmet Insel refers to the work of Marc Jacquemain and Nadine Rosa-Rosso in order to
explain two differing definitions of secularism. According to one definition, secularism denotes not
abiding by any philosophic belief whether it is faith, metaphysical or any divine power. The other
definition denotes secularism as the separation of state affairs from any religious or philosophical
belief. Ahmet Insel, “Laikliğin iki anlamı” Radikal, January 30, 2011. The book referenced
above: Marc Jacquemain and Nadine Rosa-Rosso, Du Bon Usage de la laicité, Bruxelles: Ed Aden,
2008.
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE “TURKISH MODEL” TO MOROCCO
SUMMER 2012 105
24. Muhammad Tozy, “Islam and the State” in Bruce Maddy Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine
(eds), The Maghrib in the New Century: Identity, Religion and Politics (Florida: University of
Florida Press, 2007), p. 106.
25. C. R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830 (New York: New York University Press, 2000), p.11.
For more information about the dominance of the king in Moroccan politics, see Mark A.Tessler,
“Morocco: Institutional Pluralism and Monarchical Dominance,” in William Zartman(ed), Political
Elites in Arab North Africa (United Kingdom: Longman, 1982).
26. Although the Alaoui family has ruled the country since the 17th century, the Sharifian dynasty
goes back to the rule of Idris I (788-793 C.E) and his son Idris II (793-828), who established
the dynasty around the city of Fez. (C. R. Pennell, Morocco since 1830 (New York: New York
University Press, 2000), p.11.
27. Mohamed Daadaoui, “Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco: Limited Elections
as Positional Strategies,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.46, No.2, (March 2010), 195-219, p.202.
28. Article 48: The king leads the Council of Ministers; Article 51: The king can dissolve
either of the two chambers in parliament; Article 52: The king’s address to the parliament
cannot be debated; Article 53: The king is in charge of military appointments; Article
55: The king appoints ambassadors; Article 56: The king presides over the High Judiciary
Council; Article 58: The king has the authority to declare a state of emergency.
For the French version of the 2011 Constitution see: http://www.sidislimanecity.com/index.php/
actualites/non-categorise/2117-texte-integral-de-la-nouvelle-constitution-marocaine.
29. Article 4 of the 2011 Moroccan Constitution.
30. Texte Intégral de la Nouvelle Constitution Marocaine, (June 19, 2011), retrieved May 3,
2012 from http://www.sidislimanecity.com/index.php/actualites/non-categorise/2117-texte-integral-
de-la-nouvelle-constitution-marocaine.
31. Mary Jane C. Parmentier, “Secularization and Islamisation in Morocco and Algeria,” The
Journal of North African Studies, Vol.4, No.4, (Winter, 1999), 27-50, p.35.
32. The author’s interview with Abdelilah Benkirane, March 8, 2010, Rabat.
33. A well-known Moroccan political scientist Muhammad Darif argues that Islam is used in
the constitution “not in the name of religious law” but “in the name of customary and traditional
practices.” Muhammad Darif, برغملا يف ةسايسلاو نيدلا [Religion and Politics in Morocco]
(Casablanca: Najah al-Jadid, 2000), p.35.
34. Editorial, “To Fast or Not to Fast,” Economist, (August 12, 2010), retrieved June 1, 2012
from http://www.economist.com/node/16793362?story_id=16793362.
35. Editorial, “ ةسايسلاب نيدلا فيظوت يف حجني يبراغملا يسايسلا ماظنلا [The Moroccan
Political System Succeeds in Utilizing Religion in Politics]” Middle-East Online, (August 29,
2010), retrieved May 20, 2012 from http://www.middle-east-online.com/?id=96887.
36. Tozy, “Islam and the State” in Bruce Maddy Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine (eds),
p.118.
37. Editorial, “Morocco Women Preachers Appointed,” BBC News, (May 4, 2006), retrieved
May 20, 2012 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4971792.stm.
38. Ismail Hamoudi, “ ةيمالسإ ةلود يف لمعت بازحأ جمانرب يف فيعض لكشبرضحي مالسإلا
[Islam displays a weak presence in the programs of those political parties functioning within an
Islamic state,]” al-Tajdid, August 29, 2007. Later, this decision was incorporated into Article 7 of
the 2011 Constitution.
39. Amr Hamzawy, “Party for Justice and Development in Morocco,” Carnegie Papers, Number
93, (July 2008).
40. The 1997 Electoral Program of the MPDC, Al-Raya (October 30, 1997) and PJD, 2002
National Election Manifesto (Rabat: Matbaa bil-Maris, 2002), p.7.
41. Khadija Mohsen-Finan and Malika Zeghal, “Opposition Islamiste et Pouvoir Monarchique
au Maroc,” Revue Française de Science Politique, Vol.56, No.1 (February 2006), 79-119, p.108-
115.
FERİHA PEREKLİ
106 INSIGHT TURKEY
42. PJD, “ 1997 ءاطعو مازتلإ سمخلا تاونسلا ةليصح باونلا سلجمب ةيمنتلاو ةلادعلا قيرف –
2002 [5 Years in the House of Representatives: PJD Activities between 1997 and 2002] (Rabat:
Matbaa bil-Maris, 2002), p.32-36.
43. Ibid, p.37.
44. Ibid.
45. The MPDC’s 1997 electoral manifesto, al-Tajdid, October 30, 1997.
46. The author’s interview with Abdelilah Benkirane, March 8, 2010, Rabat.
47. Tawfiq Bouachrine, “ ناغودرأ نوكي نأ ديري ال ناريكنب [Benkirane Does Not Want to be
Erdoğan],” retrieved May 10, 2012, from http://hespress.com/writers/40928.html; see also Interview
with Benkirane, “ ادیدج يشونغ لاو ناغودرأ تسلو ...ناریك نب ھللإا دبع يمسا [My name is Abdelilah
Benkirane, I am neither Erdoğan nor a new Ghannoushi],” Sharq al-Aswat (November 23, 2011),
retrieved May 12, 2012 from http://aawsat.com/print.asp?did=651119&issueno=12048.
48. The author’s interview with Mustafa Ramid, March 11, 2010, Casablanca.
49. Darif, برغملا يف ةسايسلاو نيدلا [Religion and Politics in Morocco], p. 39-43.
50. Emad El-Shahin, Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in the North Africa
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), p.189.
51. Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: An Overview,”
in Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble (eds), Political Liberalization and Democratization
in the Arab World (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p.45.
52. Marina Ottaway and Meredith Riley, “Morocco: From Top-down Reform to Democratic
Transition?,” Carnegie Papers, Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Number 71 (September 2006), p.5-6.
53. El-Shahin, Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in the North Africa, p.191.
54. Editorial, “ ةيطارقميدلا ةيروتسدلا ةيبعش ةكرحلل ديدج مسإلا [A New Name for the
MPDC],” al-‘Asr (October 5, 1998); see also Dr. Khatib’s statement on the name change, al-‘Asr
(October 5, 1998).
55. Darif, برغملا يف ةسايسلاو نيدلا [Religion and Politics in Morocco], p.104.
56. Muhammad Hamdawi, “ تاباختنالا يف نييمالسإلا ةكراشم ىودج ام ؟ [What are the Benefits
of the Islamists’ Political Participation in the Elections?],” al-Tajdid, October 17, 2010; Interview
with Muhammad Hamdawi, “ ةاضق ال ةاعد جهنم ةرئاد عيسوتل ةجاحب ةيمالسإلا ةكرحلا [The
Islamist movement needs to broaden its horizons, “Invite, not Judge”],” Islamonline, (December
12, 2010), retrieved May 10, 2012 from http://www.alislah.ma/2011-06-07-12-43-40/item/17058-
ةاضق-ال-ةاعد-جهنم-ةرئاد-عيسوتل-ةجاحب-ةيمالسإلا-ةكرحلا .html.
57. Abdesselam Yassine, Winning Modern World for Islam (Iowa: Justice and Spirituality
Publishing, 2000), p.105.
58. El-Shahin, Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in the North Africa, p.168.
59. The author’s interview with Nadia Yassine, April 12, 2010, Rabat.
60. Interview with Necmettin Erbakan: “ تاططخمو ةيبرغلا ةيلاربمإلا نم ايكرت صيلختل يعسن
ةيملاع ةينويهص [We aim to rid Turkey of Western Imperialist and global Zionist plans],” al-Islah,
August 4, 1989; Conversation with Erbakan “ لكاشملل ةيعيبط الولح لكشت هافرلا بزح جمانرب
ةيكرتلا [The program of the Welfare Party has solutions Turkey’s problems],” al-Islah, January
3, رايتلا ربكألا حبارلا يمالسإلا“ ; 1988 [The Islamic wing is the biggest winner],” al-Raya, April
5,1994; Editorial, “ فلاحتلا ةيبرغلا تاوق درطب هدالب ةموكح بلاطي ناكبرأ [Erbakan demands that
his government withdraw [their] forces from the Western Alliance]” al-Raya, September 13, 1994;
Muhammad Abasi, “ 72 اماع يف ايكرت مكحل يمالسا ءارزو سيئر لوأ ناكبرأ [Erbakan: the first Islamist
Prime Minister to rule Turkey in 72 years],” al-Raya, July 23, 1996.
61. The author’s interview with Mustafa Khalfi, December 7, 2009, Rabat.
62. Mustafa Khalfi, “ يكرتلا جذومنلا ةيبذاجو نويمالسإلا [Islamists and Attraction of the Turkish
Model],” Hespress (November 21,2011), retrieved May 8, 2012 from http://hespress.com/
writers/41727.html.
63. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Islamists in Power: Views from Within,”
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE “TURKISH MODEL” TO MOROCCO
SUMMER 2012 107
April 5, 2012, retrieved June 15, 2012 from http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/05/buildingnew-
regimes-after-uprisings/a6sm.
64. Mustafa Khalfi, “ جذومنلا ةيبذاجو نويمالسإلا [Islamists and Attraction of the Turkish
Model],” Hespress (November 21,2011), retrieved May 23,2012 from http://hespress.com/
writers/41727.html.
65. Mary Bernstein, “Identity Politics,” Annual Review of Sociology, Vol.31, (2005), 47-74,
p.49.
66. “Tayyip Erdoğan: Meclis inananları bekliyor,” Milli Gazete, August, 11, 1986; “Tekdal:
inananlar Refah için buluşuyor,” Milli Gazete, May 13,1985; “Tekdal: siyaset inananlar için gerekli,”
Milli Gazete, March 3, 1985”;, “Inananların oyları Refah’ta toplanıyor,” Milli Gazete, November
27,1987; “ Inananlar eziliyor,” Milli Gazete, April 21, 1989; “ 20.yıl heyecanı: Inananların
heyecanı,” Milli Gazete, 24 January 24, 1990; Interview with Erbakan, “Bu zulme daha fazla ortak
olmayın RP’de birleşin…,” Panel Dergisi, Issue 5 (May 31, 1989).
67. Editorial, “ RP’de Değişim Sancıları,” Yeni Zemin, January 1993, 29-41.
68. In addition to this, the WP ordered 30 tons of flags, and imported hot-air balloons from
Holland. Hürriyet, October 2, 1991.
69. Milliyet, October 13, 1991.
70. Zaman, October 4, 1991.
71. Türkiye, October 18, 1991.
72. For more information on February 28 Process, see: Ümit Cizre and Menderes Çınar, “Turkey
2002: Kemalism, Islamism and Politics in the Light of the February 28 Process,” The South
Atlantic Quarterly, 102:2/3 (Spring/Summer 2003), 309-332.
73. The Virtue Party’s 1999 National Elections Manifesto, April 1999, p.1.
74. Ibid, p.2.
75. Ibid, p. 36.
76. The author’s interview with Mustafa Khalfi, December 7, 2009, Rabat.
77. Malika Zeghal, Islamism in Morocco: Religion, Authoritarianism, and Electoral Politics
(NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2008), p.235.
78. Micheal J. Willis, “Justice and Development or Justice and Spirituality?” in Bruce Maddy
Weitzman and Daniel Zisenwine, The Maghrib in the New Century, Identity, Religion and Politics
(Florida: University of Florida, 2007), p.162.
79. Interview with Muhammad Yatim, al-Tajdid, September 24-26, 2004.
80. Muhammad Yatim, “ ةيمالسإلا تاكرحلا دنع يتايوهلا باطخلا يف ةيدقن ةءارق [A critical
reading on the identity discourse of the Islamist Movements]” reprinted from al-Tajdid, May 30,
2008.
81. The author’s interview with Muhammad Hamdawi, March 9, 2010, Rabat. On the discussion
of “tamyīz” see also Saad Eddin Othmani, لصفلا ال زييمتلاو ،ةسايسلاو نيدلا [Religion
and Politics: Not Separation but Differentiation], Casablanca: The Center of Arab Culture, 2009,
p.120.
82. Ibid, p.128.
83. The author’s interview with Abdelilah Benkirane, March 8, 2010, Rabat.
84. Ibid.
85. The author’s interview with Muhammad Hamdawi, March 9, 2010, Rabat.
86. Khadija Mohsen-Finan and Malika Zeghal, “Opposition Islamiste et Pouvoir Monarchique
au Maroc,” p.99.
87. Saad Eddin Othmani, لصفلا ال زييمتلاو ،ةسايسلاو نيدلا [Religion and Politics: Not
Separation but Differentiation], p.130.
88. PJD, Party Performance Report April 2004- July 2008, p.15.
89. PJD, 2007 National Election Manifesto, Casablanca:Imarisi, 2007, p.11.
90. Amr Hamzawy, “Party for Justice and Development in Morocco,” Carnegie Papers, Number
93, July 2008, p.12.
FERİHA PEREKLİ
108 INSIGHT TURKEY
91. PJD, 2007 National Election Manifesto, Casablanca: Imarisi, 2007, p.6-7.
92. PJD, 2002 National Election Manifesto, Rabat: Bil-Maris, 2002, p.4
93. PJD, 2007 National Election Manifesto, Casablanca:Imarisi, 2007, p.55.
94. Ibid, p.12.
95. Ibid, p.11.
96. PJD, 2009 Municipal Election Manifesto, p.7.
97. Ibid, p.29.
98. Marina Ottaway describes the term makhzen as “an elite of palace retainers, regional and
provincial administrators, and military officers, but eventually embracing all persons in the service
of the monarchy and connected to it by entrenched patronage” see: Marina Ottaway and Meredith
Riley, “Morocco: From top-down Reform to Democratic Transition?”, Carnegie Papers, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, September 2006, Number 71, p.4.
99. Editorial, “ تاعاطق سمخل ىوصق ةيمهأ يلوتس ةلبقملا ةموكحلا :ناريكنب [Benkirane: The
incoming government will give utmost importance to five sectors],” Hespress (December 9,2011),
retrieved May 2, 2012 from http://hespress.com/politique/42926.html.
100. Editorial, “Fighting corruption should be based on a long-term vision- Head of Government”
Morocco World News (March 6,2012), retrieved May 12,2012, from http://www.moroccoworldnews.
com/2012/03/30274/fighting-corruption-should-be-based-on-a-long-term-vision-headof-
government.
101. Editorial, “Maroc : Benkirane reconnait que la lutte contre la corruption est très difficile,”
Yabiladi (July 4, 2012), retrieved July 5, 2012 from http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/
details/11701/maroc-benkirane-reconnait-lutte-contre.html.
102. Editorial, “Un député du PJD accuse l’ex-ministre des Finances Mézouar d’avoir perçu
400 000 dhs pendant son mandate,” Yabiladi (June 12, 2012), retrieved June 15, 2012 from http://
www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/11275/depute-accuse-l-ex-ministre-finances-mezouar.html.
103. Editorial, “Maroc : Le roi rappelle à l’ordre les ministres du PJD,” Yabiladi (June
25,2012), retrieved July 1, 2012 from http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/11505/maroc-rappelle-
l-ordre-ministres.html.
104. Souhail Karam, “Morocco to reform subsidies in H1: minister,” Reuters (May 29, 2012), retrieved
June 2, 2012 from http://af.reuters.com/article/investingNews/idAFJOE84S07J20120529.
105. Ibid.
106. “The PJD’s Electoral Manifesto for November 25, 2011,” retrieved from (May 10, 2012)
http://pjd.ma/sites/default/files/Pr%C3%A9sentation-pjd-programme2011.pdf.
107. “Morocco PM vows direct grants of cash to the poor,” Morocco Tomorrow (June 7,
2012), retrieved June 10, 2012 from http://moroccotomorrow.org/2012/06/07/morocco-pm-vowsdirect-
grants-of-cash-to-the-poor/.